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The United States Social Security Amendments of 1983 (SSA1983) increased the full retirement 
age (FRA) and increased penalties for retiring before the FRA. This cut to retirement benefits caused 
spillover effects on Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) applications and receipt by making SSDI 
relatively more generous. We explore if stronger disability and age discrimination laws moderated these 
spillovers, using variation whereby many state laws are broader or stronger than federal law. We estimate 
the effects of these laws on SSDI applications and receipt using a difference-in-differences approach, 
comparing cohorts affected by SSA1983 to similarly aged unaffected cohorts, across states. We find that 
a broader definition of disability, where only a medically diagnosed condition is required to be covered 
under state law, significantly reduces SSDI applications induced by SSA1983, but has no effect on SSDI 
receipt, likely because the foregone applications were for those with less severe conditions that were 
unlikely to have been approved for SSDI. We find some evidence that other broader or stronger features 
of state disability discrimination laws reduce both SSDI applications and receipt. We do not find much 
evidence that age discrimination laws reduce spillovers to SSDI. These results suggest that broader and 
stronger disability discrimination laws reduce employment barriers, allowing older individuals to work 
longer, possibly reducing reliance on SSDI and costly applications to SSDI. 
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The Social Security Amendments of 1983 (SSA1983) made many significant cuts to the 
Social Security program. SSA1983 increased the full retirement age (FRA), the age at which 
individuals could retire with full Social Security benefits. The FRA increased gradually from 65 
to 67 for cohorts born from 1938 or later, based on a graduated scale that increased for cohorts 
born later. SSA1983 also increased the penalty of claiming Old Age Survivor Insurance (OASI) 
benefits before the FRA for cohorts born from 1938 or later. Table 1 shows how the SSA1983 
increased the FRA and reduced OASI benefits at different retirement ages, by year of birth. For 
example, for an eligible worker born in 1937 and unaffected by SSA1983, the monthly OASI 
benefit was 20 percent lower each month if benefits were claimed starting at age 62 relative to if 
claiming started at the FRA. However, for an eligible worker born in 1943 who was affected by 
the SSA1983, the monthly OASI benefit was 25 percent lower at age 62 than at the FRA.  
This amendment made it such that retiring at the previous FRA of 65 or earlier meant a 
cut in benefits, forcing individuals to choose between a cut in benefits or attempting to work 
longer to delay retirement. The SSA1983 was intended to increase employment and delay OASI 
benefit claiming to achieve the program’s financial solvency in the long run. Standard labor 
economic theory suggests that the SSA1983, did, in fact, increase labor supply,1 and Neumark 
and Song (2013), Behaghel and Blau (2012), and Song and Manchester (2007) document this 
empirically. 
However, part of the reduction in spending for OASI benefits in the short run through 
these reforms were offset by the spillover effects onto the Social Security Disability Insurance 
 
1 The SSA1983 reduces the expected discounted value of Social Security benefits, which is effectively a cut 
in benefits, leading to a negative income effect and an increase in labor supply under the realistic assumption that 
leisure is a normal good. See Neumark and Song (2013) for a more detailed discussion. 
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(SSDI) program. For many older individuals, SSDI and OASI benefits are substitutes,2 making 
SSDI relatively more generous, after the cut imposed by the SSA1983, at all ages before 
reaching the FRA for the affected cohorts. Li and Maestas (2008) document these spillovers, 
finding that an average four months’ increase in the FRA for those born between 1938 and 1940 
increases the SSDI application rate by 0.04 to 0.30 percentage points, a moderate increase 
relative to the application rate of 4.3 percent for the affected cohort. They find a much stronger 
effect, ranging from a 0.22 to a 0.89 percentage point increase, for individuals at or above age 62 
and for individuals having work-limiting health problems. Duggan, Singleton, and Song (2007) 
find that 0.6 percent of men and 0.9 percent of women between the ages of 45 and 64 were 
enrolled in SSDI program in 2005 due to the relative generosity of SSDI program induced by the 
SSA1983.  
In this paper, we explore whether stronger disability and age discrimination laws 
moderated the spillover effects of SSA1983 on SSDI application and receipt. Disability and age 
discrimination laws are intended to improve the employment of individuals with disabilities by 
reducing employment discrimination. Disability discriminations laws have the added 
requirement that employers provide “reasonable accommodations” to workers with disabilities. 
These discriminatory protections and on-the-job accommodations are important for some older 
individuals caught by the SSA1983 who then become possible applicants for SSDI. Reducing 
discrimination and improving on-the-job accommodations can increase hiring or employment or 
reduce labor force exit and subsequent SSDI application. Thus, stronger discrimination 
protections could reduce barriers to work for those close to retirement who are affected by the 
SSA1983 and could also reduce spillovers onto SSDI. 
 
2 Since the incidence of disability rises with age (see, e.g., Ameri et al. 2018; Neumark, Song, and Button 
2017), many seniors may be eligible, or perceive that they are eligible, for both programs. 
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To explore how disability and age discrimination laws affect spillovers to SSDI, we focus 
on the differences in state discrimination laws, which are often stronger or broader than the 
federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (Long 2004; Neumark, Song, and Button 
2017) and the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Many state laws 
are stronger or broader than the federal ADA or ADEA in three primary ways: 
1) by lowering the burden of proof, relative to the ADA, for plaintiffs to establish under law 
that they have a disability (“medical definition of disability”); 
2) by covering employers with fewer than 15 employees (the minimum for the ADA to 
apply) or 20 employees (ADEA), “lower firm size (disability),” “lower firm size (age)”; 
and 
3) by allowing plaintiffs to sue for more damages than allowed by the ADA or the ADEA 
“larger damages (disability),” “larger damages (age).” 
Using a difference-in-differences (DD) regression analysis, we estimate the effects of 
these stronger and broader discrimination laws on labor market outcomes (in progress), SSDI 
application, and SSDI receipt. We compare cohorts affected and unaffected by SSA1983 in 
states with and without discrimination law features, controlling for age. If, for example, SSDI 
application is higher for those affected by the SSA1983 (as we and others document), but this 
effect is weaker in states with stronger discrimination laws, then this suggests that these laws 
decrease spillovers and reduce barriers to employment. 
This paper provides several contributions to the literature. First, the effect of disability 
and age discrimination laws on labor market outcomes is still not yet clear. Theory suggests 
ambiguous impacts of discrimination law on employment outcomes, as the laws could reduce 
terminations by increasing firing costs and improving employer accommodations, but these 
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increased costs could reduce hiring by making individuals with disabilities more expensive to 
hire (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). Empirical studies have not settled the question either, as they 
all reach different conclusions, such that there is no clear consensus for the disability 
discrimination law literature (see discussions in Button [2018]; Button, Armour, and Hollands 
[2018a]) or the age discrimination law literature (see discussions in Neumark and Button [2014]; 
Neumark et al. [2019]). The literature on the effect of disability discrimination laws on older 
workers is even less developed (Neumark, Song, and Button 2017; Neumark et al. 2019; Stock 
and Beegle 2004). 
The SSA1983 provides an important, exogenous source of variation for which to identify 
the effects of these laws on labor market outcomes and SSDI application and receipt. The 
SSA1983 affects older workers uniformly in a way that is not correlated with existing state laws. 
Therefore, we avoid the possible endogeneity of discrimination laws, which could have been a 
problem in prior work, such as studies that exploit just federal changes in laws (e.g., Acemoglu 
and Angrist 2001), the adoption of state laws over time (e.g., Beegle and Stock 2003; Button 
2018; Stock and Beegle 2004) or, worse, just do a cross-sectional comparison of outcomes by 
state laws (e.g., Neumark, Song, and Button 2017). If state laws are endogenous, then this can 
lead to biased estimates of their impact (Besley and Case 2000). For example, if states are more 
likely to adopt stronger discrimination laws when protected groups fare worse, then this 
negatively biases the estimated impact of these laws. 
 Our research design allows us to identify the effects of the SSA1983 using a more 
realistic control group than in much of the prior literature. Many studies (e.g., Acemoglu and 
Angrist 2001; DeLeire 2000, 2001) use control groups (e.g., individuals with vs. without 
disabilities) that violate parallel trend assumptions because the groups have significantly 
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different trends (Button 2018; Mora and Reggio 2019). In our case, we can use cohorts that are 
more similar, those affected (cohorts born 1938 to 1951) and unaffected (1931 to 1937) by the 
SSA1983, controlling for age, which provides for a control group that is more likely to have 
similar trends. But we go beyond this by comparing the affected and unaffected cohorts across 
states by existing state law, thus controlling for any differences in trends between these two 
groups. Our assumption to identify an unbiased causal effect of state laws is thus that the age-
specific trend difference between affected and unaffected cohorts does not vary by existing state 
law. This is a much weaker assumption than in much of the previous literature that studies the 
effects of discrimination laws on labor market outcomes. 
Second, we know very little about how disability and age discrimination laws affect 
application and receipt of SSDI.3 Our paper provides evidence of the effectiveness of important 
labor demand-side polices that could reduce the spillover effects of the Social Security reforms 
and otherwise reduce barriers to employment and help alleviate strain on the Social Security 
Trust Fund. This is critical because the fund risks being exhausted by 2034 as the population 
continues to age, leading to increased withdrawals from the fund in the form of a higher case 
load for OASI and SSDI (Board of Trustees 2017). 
 
3 To our knowledge, the only study to look at how disability discrimination laws affect SSDI is Jolls and 
Prescott (2004), who analyzed this briefly in their NBER working paper. Additional work is in progress on this by 
Button, Armour, and Hollands (2017a). There is some related work, though, on how age discrimination laws affect 
claiming OASI (Neumark and Song 2013). 
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BACKGROUND ON SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS 
Social Security Amendments of 1983 (SSA1983) 
Since 1975, under the existing law, the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
(OASDI) program expenditures exceeded the revenues and it was anticipated that, without any 
legislative changes to the program, it would have been impossible to pay the OASDI cash 
benefits on time beginning in July 1983. To deal primarily with the short-and long-term financial 
challenges faced by the OASDI program, the SSA1983 was signed into law on April 20, 1983. 
This law made comprehensive changes in Social Security coverage, financing, and benefit 
structure. The changes brought about by this law include an increase in the payroll tax rate,4 
expansion of the program to some federal government employees,5 and an increase in the 
actuarial adjustment factors beyond the FRA, increasing the benefit to retiring after the FRA 
(Svahn and Ross 1983).6 Perhaps the most significant change was a maximum of a two-year 
increase in the FRA and a corresponding increase from 20 to 30 percent in the penalty for 
claiming OASI benefits at the early retirement age of 62.  
As we show in Table 1, these reductions in the generosity of OASI benefits were phased 
in gradually and occurred in two main stages. Individuals born in 1937 or earlier were unaffected 
by the change. The FRA then increased in two-month increments by subsequent birth cohort 
until reaching 66 for those born in 1943. For individuals born between 1943 and 1954 (inclusive) 
 
4 SSA1983 increased the Social Security tax rates, which included the Hospital Insurance tax rates, for 
employers and employees from 7.0 percent in 1984 (subject to a credit of 0.3 percent to employees) to 7.65 percent 
in 1990 and thereafter. 
5 SSA1983 added the following groups under the Social Security system: (i) all federal employees hired on 
or after January 1, 1984; (ii) employees of the legislative branch not participating in the Civil Service Retirement 
System on December 31, 1983; and (iii) all members of Congress, the president and the vice president, federal 
judges, and other political appointees of the federal government, effective January 1, 1984. 
6 SSA1983 increased the delayed retirement credits gradually from 3 percent for workers reaching FRA 
before 1990, to 8 percent for workers reaching the FRA after 2008. 
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the FRA remained at 66 years until again increasing in two-month increments from the 1955 to 
1960 cohorts. Along with this change, the proportion of full benefits that individuals could 
receive at the early retirement age of 62 fell from 80 percent for those born in 1937 to 75 percent 
for those born between 1943 and 1954, and to 70 percent for those born in 1960 or later.7 While 
these amendments changed the OASI benefit structure, they did not change the benefit structure 
of the SSDI program, leading SSDI to be relatively more generous for some affected older 
workers. 
Social Security Disability Insurance 
The SSDI program is a social insurance program for workers with disabilities, with 
eligibility conditioned on previous sufficient employment in jobs covered by Social Security.8 It 
is a part of the larger OASDI program of Social Security. The SSDI program defines disability as 
the “inability to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment(s) which can be expected to result in death or which 
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”9 An 
activity is considered “substantial” if it involves significant physical and/or mental exertion and 
“gainful” if it is performed for pay or profit. SSA implements the definition of SGA by setting an 
earnings threshold, which is adjusted over time. For example, in 2018 the earnings threshold was 
 
7 This policy also changed the actuarial adjustment factors beyond the age of 62 from five-ninths of a 
percentage point per month to five-twelfths of a percentage point per month. This converted back to five-ninths of a 
percentage point 36 months before the full retirement age. Thus, a person born in 1943 could receive 75 percent of 
his or her PIA at the age of 62, 80 percent at the age of 63, 86.67 percent at the age of 64, 93.33 percent at the age of 
65, and 100 percent at age 66. 
8 To qualify for SSDI, the required amount of labor force attachment depends on the age of disability onset. 
Generally, one needs to have worked 10 years, 5 of which needs to be during the 10 years preceding the year of 
SSDI application. Relatively younger workers may qualify with less work experience than this general rule. 
9 Code of Federal regulation § 404.1505 at https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/404/404-1505.htm 
(accessed September 13, 2018). 
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$1,180 per month for nonblind individuals and $1,970 per month for blind individuals.10 Anyone 
who is earning over the threshold is considered as engaging in SGA and is therefore disqualified 
from participating in the SSDI program. 
Individuals apply for SSDI benefits at their local field office, which screens out those who 
are not currently insured (have insufficient work history covered by Social Security) or who are 
engaging in SGA. These are labeled as “technical denials” and do not receive further review. The 
remaining applications are forwarded to a state Disability Determination Services (DDS) office, 
where cases are assigned randomly to disability examiners for review. The disability examiner 
makes the determination of disability using eligibility rules and medical and vocational criterion 
laid out in the code of federal regulations. The rejected applicants at the DDS level are then entitled 
to a series of appeals.11 The applicants can bring in new information to each level of appeals to 
make their case stronger. Because the appeal process can take months or sometimes years, to get 
final adjudication, some applicants who appeal the DDS rejection may simultaneously file a new 
application. 
In 2016, approximately 8.8 million individuals with disabilities received SSDI benefits.12 
Among these beneficiaries, 4.5 million were men and 4.3 million were women. The average age 
of beneficiaries was 54 years. Of the population aged 18–64, 4.7 percent received SSDI benefits 
in 2016. The average cash benefit received was $1,171 in 2016 ($1,293 for men, $1,043 for 
women), for a total of $11.3 billion across all beneficiaries. On average, two-thirds of the SSDI 
applicants are denied benefits at the Disability Determination Services (DDS) office. In 2015 
 
10 DI 10501.015 - Tables of SGA Earnings Guidelines and Effective Dates Based on Year of Work Activity 
at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0410501015 (accessed August 2, 2018). 
11 First, the reconsideration stage, where the application returns to the original DDS to be reviewed by a 
different disability examiner, then to the Administrative Law Judge, then to an Appeals Council, and finally to the 
federal court system. 
12 This is 87 percent of awards to all SSDI beneficiaries, with the remaining 13 percent going to disabled 
widow(er)s and disabled adult children (Social Security Administration 2017). 
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alone, 2.4 million individuals applied for SSDI and 1.5 million were denied at the DDS level. 
However, a fraction of these denied applicants appeal their initial denial and get approved for the 
benefits.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Social Security Programs 
SSDI is a federal program, and the Social Security Act and the regulations implementing 
it set up universal criteria to determine the disability status of someone who applies for SSDI 
benefits. Historically, not only are there variations in the application rate for SSDI across states13 
and over time but there also are similar variations in the receipt rate of SSDI (McVicar 2006; 
Stapleton et al. 1998). Much of the variations in application and receipt rates can be explained by 
economic, health, and demographic factors (Coe et al. 2011; Gruber and Kubik 1997; Strand 
2002). We contribute to this literature by incorporating the effects of state discrimination laws in 
explaining the variations in SSDI application and receipt rates across states.  
Both OASI and SSDI’s cash benefits are calculated based on earnings history (see 
Appendix 2 for more details). The main difference between the OASI and SSDI benefit 
calculations is in the actuarial adjustment factors applicable only to OASI when the benefit is 
claimed between age 62 and the FRA. The SSA1983 increased not only the FRA for cohorts 
born after 1937, but also the penalty of claiming OASI benefits earlier than the FRA. Individuals 
may apply for SSDI benefits up to their FRA, and there is no penalty in claiming the SSDI 
 
13 In three states—Alaska, Hawaii, and Utah—the SSDI beneficiaries represent less than 3 percent of the 
state population. On the other hand, six states with the highest level of SSDI beneficiaries—7 percent or more of 
state population—were Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, and West Virginia. 
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benefits earlier than the FRA. The fact that SSDI benefits, unlike OASI benefits, are not subject 
to actuarial reduction makes SSDI application quite valuable to individuals who think that they 
are disabled enough to qualify for SSDI.  
The present value of OASI benefits at any given age is considerably lower for cohorts 
affected by the SSA1983, and the reduction is greater for the cohorts with a higher FRA, making 
SSDI relatively more generous than OASI for younger cohorts insured under both programs 
(Duggan, Singleton, and Song 2007). Theoretically, this relative generosity provides greater 
incentives for people who would have claimed the OASI benefits earlier than the FRA to apply 
for and possibly get enrolled in the SSDI program. 
As birth year and age are the key determinants in reducing the OASI benefits claimed 
before the FRA, all else remaining the same, the incentive to apply for SSDI is higher for cohorts 
born in more recent years and for those who are closer to the age of claiming OASI benefits (see 
Table 1). Consequently, this incentive is proportionately greater at any given age for workers 
born on or after 1938, depending on their FRA, compared to people born on or before 1937. As a 
result, the incentive to apply for SSDI is proportionately greater for workers with higher FRA at 
any age before their FRA. Duggan, Singleton, and Song (2007) and Li and Maestas (2008) 
provide empirical evidence that the SSA1983 did indeed increase the SSDI application and 
receipt of workers affected by the law. Our paper contributes to this literature by providing 
evidence of differential spillover effects of the SSA1983 on SSDI programs across states due to 
the variations in state discrimination laws. 
Effects of Employment Discrimination Laws 
There are three lines of related literature on the effects of discrimination laws on labor 
market outcomes. First, there is the literature on the effect of disability discrimination laws on 
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labor market outcomes, and sometimes SSDI claiming, for individuals with disabilities. Second, 
there is literature on the effect of age discrimination laws on labor market outcomes and 
retirement for older workers. Third, there is a small but growing literature on the effect of 
disability discrimination laws on the labor market outcomes of older workers. Also related are 
discrimination laws covering other groups, summarized by Button (2018). Broadly speaking, the 
research on the effects of discrimination laws on labor market outcomes does not come to a clear 
conclusion, although the mixed results tend to lean positive. 
Economic theory 
Economic theory predicts mixed impacts of discrimination law. Protecting a group from 
discrimination should reduce firing because firing a worker, regardless of whether there is 
discriminatory intent or not, opens employers to the risk of legal action. For disability laws 
specifically, quits could also decrease because the “reasonable accommodations” provided by 
some employers, a requirement under the ADA, could increase job satisfaction, help manage 
health conditions that impact work, or increase productivity (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). 
However, the theoretical effect on hiring is less clear. Since the law forbids 
discrimination in hiring, hiring could increase. However, there is little scope for hiring 
discrimination to be detected or enforced compared to discrimination in firing where there are 
better worker records that could then be used in legal case. There is also much less incentive for 
attorneys to take on hiring discrimination cases because it is difficult to identify a class of 
affected workers, and the possible damages are much smaller (Neumark and Button 2014). There 
in fact could be a negative effect on hiring, as the higher possible firing costs (and the 
accommodation costs for disabilities) make a protected worker more expensive to hire in the first 
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place (Bloch 1994). In net it is not clear what the effect is on hiring, and if, after considering the 
effects on separations, there is a positive or negative effect on employment. 
Disability discrimination laws and individuals with disabilities 
The empirical studies analyzing the effects of disability discrimination laws on labor 
market outcomes for individuals with disabilities often come to different conclusions. We 
summarize these studies in Appendix Table A1. Early work found negative effects of the ADA 
on employment of individuals with disabilities (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; DeLeire 2000, 
2001). Numerous scholars questioned these results on technical grounds.  
Kruse and Schur (2003) argue that the “work-limited” measure of disability used in 
previous studies was endogenous to employment, leading to a negatively biased estimated effect 
of the ADA on employment. They also argue that the “work-limited” measure was very different 
than the definition of disability in the ADA. They developed a new set of disability measures 
using the functional limitation modules in the SIPP. They created a set of disability indicators 
defining an individual as having a disability if they report at least one limitation to an activity of 
daily life (ADL). This is more in line with the definition of the ADA, which requires that an 
individual is “substantially limited” in a “major life activity.” Using this broader set of disability 
indicators, Kruse and Schur (2003) find that the effects of the ADA depend on the measure used, 
with negative effects only for the endogenous work-limited measure, and positive effects with 
the more appropriate ADL limitation measures. Further, Button, Armour, and Hollands (2017a) 
replicate Kruse and Schur’s (2003) comparison of work-limited and ADL measures but instead 
use hiring as one of the outcome variables and find similar results to Kruse and Schur (2003)—
that the ADA boosted hiring using the ADL measure of disability. 
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Houtenville and Burkhauser (2004), and later Button (2018) and Button, Armour, and 
Hollands (2017a), criticize the earlier research for using a control group that experienced 
different employment trends, such that the “parallel paths” (Mora and Reggio 2019) assumption 
did not hold, leading to negatively biased estimated employment effects. Houtenville and 
Burkhauser (2004) argue that, starting in the 1980s, there was a preexisting negative employment 
trend for individuals with disabilities, which was related to increased accessibility of SSDI and 
SSI programs. Bound and Waidmann (2002) also make note of this preexisting trend. 
Houtenville and Burkhauser (2004) also find no negative effects of the ADA, but instead find 
some positive effects if they instead used a work-limited measure of disability where the 
individual reported being work-limited two periods in a row. 
Hotchkiss (2004) shows that the negative estimated effects of the ADA in Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001) and DeLeire (2000, 2001) were attributable to a reclassification of individuals 
without disabilities who were not in the labor force as “disabled” under the work-limited 
measure, again reflecting concerns regarding the work-limited measure being endogenous. 
Even discounting these earlier studies, the literature since then still shows mixed effects 
of disability discrimination laws, although these results lean toward showing positive effects or 
no effects. Bell and Heitmueller (2009) find that the UK’s similar law, the Disability 
Discrimination Act, passed in 1995 and decreased employment at least in the short-term. Button, 
Armour, and Hollands (2017a) and Armour, Button, and Hollands (2018) explore variation in the 
ADA since it was originally adopted. They find mixed effects depending on how disability is 
defined, which labor market outcome (e.g., hiring vs. employment) is used, and which legal 
change is considered, although the effects generally lean positive. Using similar variation, 
Thompkins (2015) finds that neither the SCOTUS cases that narrowed the definition of disability 
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nor the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) that expanded it were 
associated with employment effects. Ameri et al. (2018) take the innovative approach of 
conducting a resume-correspondence experiment quantifying discrimination in hiring. They 
compare the interview offer rates for on-average identical resumes submitted to accounting 
positions by individuals with and without disabilities (Asperger’s or spinal cord injury), both of 
which should have no effect (or maybe even a positive effect) on productivity in accounting. 
They find that discrimination is lower for larger firms covered by the ADA compared to smaller 
firms that are not covered. However, they do not find any effects of the state disability 
discrimination laws that we explore in this paper. 
 Several studies exploit changes in disability discrimination laws at the state level, which 
allows for an additional control group: states with no changes in discrimination law. This 
additional control group is important as it does not require a direct comparison of individuals 
with and without disabilities, two groups that experience very different employment trends. It 
allows for multiple treatment and control groups, which can improve statistical inference (see, 
e.g., Donald and Lang 2007). Beegle and Stock (2003) explore the effects of state disability 
discrimination laws that were adopted before the ADA, generally finding no effect of these laws 
on employment after controlling for the preexisting differential employment trends for 
individuals with disabilities. Jolls and Prescott (2004) explore how the introduction of the ADA 
differed based on existing state laws, finding that the negative effects of the ADA found in 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and DeLeire (2000) were confined to states that did not, prior to 
the ADA, require reasonable accommodations. Button (2018) finds that employment of 
individuals with disabilities increased after California’s Prudence Kay Poppink Act in 2001, 
which broadened the definition of disability under California law. However, Button, Armour, 
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and Hollands (2017b) conduct a much broader evaluation of the effects of state disability 
discrimination laws adopted since the ADA and their early results do not find many effects. 
Age discrimination laws and older workers 
The research on how age discrimination laws affect labor market outcomes for older 
workers is also mixed, but again the effects lean positive (Appendix Table A2). Adams (2004) 
and Neumark and Stock (1999) find that the adoption of state and federal age discrimination 
laws increased employment of older workers. In contrast, Lahey (2008) finds that hiring rates for 
older workers are lower in states where it was easier to file an ADEA claim. However, Neumark 
(2009) disputes the interpretation of the results in Lahey (2008), suggesting instead that the 
results can be interpreted differently in a way that shows a positive effect.  
Recent work explores previously unexplored aspects of state age discrimination laws, 
which are also considered in this paper “lower firm size (age” and “larger damages (age).” 
Neumark and Song (2013) use a research design similar to ours and find increased hiring of older 
workers “caught” by the SSA1983 in states with age discrimination laws that have “lower firm 
size (age)” and “larger damages (age).” Neumark and Button (2014) find more mixed evidence 
suggesting that the effect of age discrimination laws may vary over the business cycle, with the 
laws perhaps having a negative effect during the Great Recession. For men, “larger damages 
(age)” is associated with shorter unemployment durations before the Great Recession, but with 
unemployment durations that increased disproportionately more for older workers during and 
after the Great Recession. For women, “larger damages (age)” is associated with increased hiring 
of older workers before the Great Recession but larger decreases in hiring during and after the 
Great Recession.  
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Neumark et al. (2019) take a unique approach, using a resume-correspondence 
experiment modeled off Neumark, Burn, and Button (2019) to measure if older workers get 
relatively fewer interview offers in states with stronger or broader age and disability 
discrimination laws (using all five measures considered in this paper). They find some evidence 
that “larger damages (age)” decreases age discrimination against older women and older men 
and “larger damages (disability)” decreases age discrimination against older women. But there is 
no evidence that broader laws, a lower firm size of a broader definition of disability, affect 
discrimination. 
Disability discrimination laws and older workers 
More importantly for this study, there is a small but growing literature on how disability 
discrimination laws affect older workers (Appendix Table A3). The first study of this kind, Stock 
and Beegle (2004), examines how the adoption of state disability discrimination laws prior to the 
ADA affected employment of older workers, finding that disability discrimination laws increase 
employment of older workers without disabilities but only when there is both an age and a 
disability discrimination law. Neumark et al. (2019), discussed above, finds that “larger damages 
(disability)” may reduce age discrimination against older women. Neumark, Song, and Button 
(2017) also provide cross-sectional evidence that a broader definition of disability is associated 
with increased relative hiring of older men. 
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DATA 
Disability Discrimination Laws 
We use a database of state disability discrimination laws first created by Neumark, Song, 
and Button (2017) and then updated by Neumark et al. (2019). The creation of this database 
required extensive background research on statutes in states and D.C.,14 and their histories 
(primarily found through Westlaw), acts that amended these statutes (primarily found using Hein 
Online), and many other sources (e.g., case law, secondary sources, law journal articles, state 
offices). See Neumark et al. (2019), and especially its online appendix, for a more detailed 
discussion of how these laws were coded. 
This database includes three dimensions of how state disability discrimination laws are 
broader or stronger than the federal ADA: “medical definition of disability,” “lower firm size 
(disability),” and “larger damages (disability).” Table 2 shows how these characteristics of 
disability discrimination laws vary by state and how we code these laws into indicator variables. 
First, and most importantly, some states have a lower burden of proof to establish a disability 
than under the definition of disability in the ADA, leading to increased coverage of disability 
discrimination law in those states. These “medical definition” states define individuals with a 
medically diagnosed condition to be disabled under law, regardless of whether their condition 
“substantially limits” a “major life activity.” Second, the ADA applies only to firms with at least 
15 employees, but state laws often cover firms with fewer workers “lower firm size (disability).” 
Third, many states also allow for plaintiffs to sue for more damages than the ADA, leading state 
 
14 For the purposes of our analysis, we consider D.C. to be a “state” since it has similar discrimination laws 
as the 50 other states, and all our data is also available for D.C. This follows the approach of similar studies that 
examine state laws (e.g., Neumark and Song 2013; Neumark, Song, and Button 2017). 
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laws to have more bite than the ADA “larger damages (disability)” (Button, Armour, and 
Hollands 2017a,b; Neumark, Song, and Button 2017; Neumark et al. 2019). Below we 
summarize this legal variation, and we refer the reader to Neumark et al. (2019) for more 
information. 
Medical definition of disability 
The federal disability discrimination in employment law, Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (effective July 1992), is significantly less broad in its coverage 
compared to employment discrimination laws covering other groups.15 This stems from a narrow 
definition of disability. For plaintiffs to establish that they have a disability under the ADA, and 
to thus even have a prima facie case that can go forward, they must meet one of the three 
definitions of disability in the ADA: 
“The term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual, (A) a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities16 
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as 
having such an impairment.” (42 U.S. Code §12102 (1)) 
The difficulty for plaintiffs was proving that the condition was at the level of 
“substantial.” The burden of proof for “substantially limits” was high, leading plaintiffs to have 
their cases effectively thrown out because they did not meet the standard (Burgdorf 1997; Colker 
1999). 
 
15 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (race, color, religion, sex, national origin) and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (age). 
16 Major life activities were not defined in the ADA but were defined later in guidance documents provided 
by the EEOC. However, these evolved over time, and the Supreme Court even weighed in on if the EEOC even had 
the mandate to define major life activities. See Button, Armour, and Hollands (2017a) for a detailed discussion.  
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Four states (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York) have a broader definition 
of disability whereby individuals are considered disabled under state law if they have a 
diagnosed medical condition.17 This is irrespective of if the condition “substantially limits” a 
“major life activity, thus significantly lowering the burden of proof for individuals in these states 
to be covered by state disability discrimination law (Long 2004; Neumark, Song, and Button 
2017). 
Lower firm size (disability) 
The ADA covers firms with at least 15 employees. As Table 2 shows, 34 states as of 
1992 had disability discrimination laws with firm size minimums that were lower than 10, 25 
states that are lower than 5, and 15 states that cover all employees regardless of firm size. The 
lower firm size matters, since older workers are especially more likely to work at smaller firms.18 
Following previous studies (Neumark, Song, and Button 2017; Neumark et al. 2019) in our 
analysis we create an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm size is less than 10, 0 otherwise, 
and compare states with a firm size of less than 10 versus greater than 10.  
Larger damages (disability) 
 There is also variation in damages available under state law. Many states allow 
more damages than the capped sum of compensatory and punitive damages that are allowed 
under the federal ADA, which range from $50,000 to $300,000, depending on the size of the 
 
17 Washington, as of May 2007, also had a medical definition of disability, but we do not include 
Washington in this list since it does not provide identification in our regression models given the data that we use. 
California and Minnesota also have a lower burden of proof to provide disability. See Button (2018). For California, 
it established this new definition of disability in 2001, which does not provide identification given our data. We do, 
however, do a robustness check where we include Minnesota with the medical definition states, and these results are 
similar, but a bit weaker, reflecting that Minnesota’s definition is not as broad. See Appendix Table D9. 
18 See discussion in Neumark and Song (2013) and Neumark and Button (2014, footnote 11). 
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firm.19 Following Neumark, Song, and Button (2017) and Neumark et al. (2019), we deem states 
to have “larger damages (disability)” if they have damage caps that exceed the ADA, or allow 
uncapped punitive damages, as punitive damages are likely to drive large judgments. As shown 
in Table 2, 13 states, as of 1992, allow larger damages than the ADA. 
Age Discrimination Laws 
We use the age discrimination laws as determined and coded by Neumark and Song 
(2013). While there are several dimensions of state laws, the important two that the literature 
focuses on (Neumark and Button 2014; Neumark and Song 2013; Neumark et al. 2019) are the 
availability of damages and the firm size minimum. The idea behind both are similar to their 
counterparts for disability, but they differ in realization.  
Lower firm size (age) 
Firm size operates similarly, except that the federal ADEA covers only firms with at least 
20 employees, while the ADA covers firms with at least 15 employees. As shown in Table 2, 
there are 46 states with a lower firm size than the ADEA, 36 states with a firm size less than 15, 
35 less than 10, 26 less than 5, and 16 that cover all firms. The firm size for age and disability 
tends to match, since both often are in the same statute, but this is not the case for 9 states as of 
1992.20 
 
19 15–100 employees ($50,000), 101–200 employees ($100,000), 201–500 employees ($200,000), and 500 
or more employees ($300,000). 
20 Since we use the less than 10 cutoff, as in the previous literature, to group states into categories based on 
minimum firm size, there are 7 states where their disability and age firm size minimums cause them to fall into 
different categories: Arkansas (disability = 9, age = no law), Georgia and Indiana (disability = 15, age = 1), Illinois 
(disability = 1, age = 15), Kentucky and Louisiana (disability = 15, age = 8), and South Dakota (disability = 1, age = 
no law). 
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Larger damages (age) 
Damages available are different for age. Instead of there being caps on compensatory and 
punitive damages, as under the ADA, the ADEA does not allow compensatory or punitive 
damages. It allows for back pay and benefits—double this amount (“liquid damages”) if there is 
willful violation (Neumark and Song 2013). We follow Neumark and Song (2013) and deem any 
state that allows compensatory or punitive damages as having “larger damages (age).” As shown 
in Table 2, there are 27 states, as of 1992, with larger damages for age discrimination. More 
states have larger damages for age than for disability because of the restrictive way that damages 
are treated in the ADEA. Because of this, the overlap for damages for age and disability under 
state laws is much lower than it is for firm size.21  
Aggregated SSDI Application and Receipt Data  
We use aggregated SSDI application and receipt data from the file-831 disability recodes, 
generated at state Disability Determination Services (DDS) offices and provided to us by the 
Social Security Administration.22 This SSA data includes the total number of applications and 
receipt of SSDI for each state by gender and age groups (age 45–49, 50–54, 55–59, and 60– 64) 
for each year from 1992 to 2013. Using the year and age group information, we categorize the 
SSDI application and receipt data by groups of birth cohorts. For example, the SSDI application 
and receipt data for the age group 55–59 and year 1992 represent the data for the birth cohorts of 
1933–1937, which are a part of the cohorts unaffected by the SSA1983. Age group 55–59 and 
year 1997 represent the application and award information of birth cohorts of 1938–1942, who 
are a part of the cohorts affected by the SSA1983. 
 
21 There are 18 states that have larger damages for disability, but not age, 3 states that have larger damages 
for age, but not disability, 10 states that have larger damages for both, and 20 states that have no larger damages. 
22 We thank Alexander Strand for providing the aggregated SSDI application and receipt data.  
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State-by-Year Demographic and Economic Variables 
We use the Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement 
(ASEC) (Flood et al. 2018) to get population estimates by gender, state, and age group from 
1992 to 2013. We generate the rate of SSDI application and receipt by dividing the number of 
SSDI applications and receipts, respectively, by the gender and age group–specific population in 
each state from 1992–2013. 
We also use the CPS ASEC to generate state- and year-specific population estimates by 
age group and gender, estimates of labor force participation rates, unemployment rates, 
proportion African American/black in the working-age population, proportion Hispanic in the 
working-age population, the proportion of population who have completed a high school 
education, the proportion of population reporting a work-limiting disability, and proportion of 
population work in the agriculture, mining, and construction industries.23 We use per capita 
disposable personal income data in current dollars by state and year from the website of the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.24 We use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of all urban consumers 
from Bureau of Labor Statistics to generate real per capita disposable personal income in 2012 
dollars.25 
Summary Statistics 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the aggregated SSDI application and receipt data, 
and the associated CPS ASEC controls. Across all states and D.C. (Column [1]), the SSDI 
application rate is 1.33 percent per year, and the SSDI receipt rate is 0.72 percent per year. 
 
23 Literature shows that these variables can explain half of the variation of the SSDI application and receipt 
rates across states (see, for example, Strand [2002]). 
24 https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.cfm (accessed August 21, 2018). 
25 https://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet (accessed August 21, 2018). 
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Notably, application rates are lower in states with a medical definition of disability (1.18 percent, 
Column [2]), compared to states without any broader or stronger disability discrimination laws 
(1.44 percent), although the difference is much smaller for receipt (0.70 percent versus 0.73 
percent). States also differ in the control variables, which are correlated with SSDI program use 
according to the previous literature (Coe et al. 2011; Gruber and Kubik 1997; Strand 2002). For 
example, states with the medical definition of disability (Column [1]) compared to states without 
stronger or broader disability discrimination laws (Column [5]) have higher real disposable 
personal incomes, lower rates of work-limiting disability, a lower proportion of the population in 
agriculture mining, or construction industries, more Hispanics, and fewer African 
Americans/blacks. 
METHODOLOGY 
We exploit state variation in the degree of disability (age) discrimination protections 
relative to the ADA (ADEA) to identify the moderating effects of stronger or broader 
discrimination laws on the spillover effects of SSA1983. Using a difference-in-differences (DD) 
framework, we estimate the effects of stronger and broader discrimination laws on SSDI 
application and receipt, based on the differences in SSDI application and receipt of cohorts 
affected by SSA1983 and unaffected cohorts observed at the same age across states. 
We start by quantifying the effects of SSA1983 on spillovers to SSDI application and 
receipt. We also start by quantifying the impact of broader and stronger disability and age 
discrimination laws on SSDI application and receipt using the cross-sectional variation in laws, 
similar to the approach used in (Neumark, Song, and Button 2017). We quantify these using the 
following regression specification: 
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+ 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 [1] 
where, 𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 represents the two outcome variables defined as the proportion of working-age 
population in age-group 𝑎𝑎 living in state 𝑠𝑠 in year 𝑡𝑡 applied for SSDI and received SSDI. Since 
receipt of SSDI occurs on average 15 months after application, we lag the SSDI receipt variable 
one year (Autor et al. 2015).26 
SSA1983 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the outcome is for cohorts 
born after 1937 (affected by SSA1983) and takes 0 otherwise (unaffected). 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 is an indicator 
variable, or a set of indicator variables, for states that have stronger or broader discrimination 
laws, discussed more below. 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 includes control variables at the state-year level: labor force 
participation rates, unemployment rates, the proportion of the working age population that has 
completed high school, the proportion that have a work-limiting disability, and per capita real 
disposable personal income. We include age-group fixed effects (a) and year fixed effects (t). 
We cluster our standard errors at the state level.  
The coefficient 𝛾𝛾 captures the average effect, across all states, of SSA1983 on spillovers 
to SSDI. The coefficient 𝜌𝜌 captures the cross-sectional difference between states with different 
discrimination laws. Because we identify 𝜌𝜌 using cross-sectional differences, the estimate of 𝜌𝜌 is 
less likely to be causal as state laws could be correlated with other factors that are also correlated 
with SSDI use.  
We then move to our main analysis, which explores how the effects of SSA1983 are 
moderated by existing state discrimination laws. Using the aggregated SSDI application and 
receipt data, we estimate the DD setup using the following regression specification: 
 
26 Results are similar, although a bit weaker, if we instead do not lag SSDI receipt and consider SSDI 
receipt contemporaneously. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Compared to Equation (1), this specification adds state fixed effects (S)27 and the 
interaction between SSA1983 and state laws (SDP). 𝛽𝛽 captures the DD estimate, which 
represents the change in the outcome variable for the cohorts affected by the SSA1983 living in 
states with stronger discrimination laws compared to both the unaffected cohorts and the affected 
cohorts living in control states without stronger laws. Our key identifying assumption is that the 
trends in the unobserved factors affecting the SSDI application and receipt of different cohorts 
do not systematically vary across states based on their discrimination laws. 
For both the analysis using Equation (1) and the main analysis using Equation (2), we 
start by examining state laws one at a time, following Neumark, Song, and Button (2017). We 
first examine disability discrimination laws. In our main specifications, our SDP indicator 
variable equals 1 for states with that particular broader or stronger dimension of disability 
discrimination law (e.g., medical definition) and 0 for states that have no stronger or broader 
disability discrimination law features at all (i.e., no medical definition, no larger damages, and a 
firm size greater than or equal to 10).28  
 
27 While almost all state laws are consistent over our sample period, there are a few states that change laws. 
Therefore, the SDP variable on its own does not always drop out with the inclusion of state fixed effects. However, 
we do not present the coefficient on this variable since it is identified off very few states, and a more credible 
research design would be required to conduct inference for these few states that change laws (see, for example, 
Button [2018]). 
28 Our main specifications differ slightly from Neumark and Song (2013) and Neumark, Song, and Button 
(2017), where their indicator variable equals zero for states that do not have that specific legal feature, regardless of 
which other legal features the state has. Our default approach provides a cleaner comparison by having the control 
group (SDP = 0) exclude states with other stronger or broader legal features. As a robustness check, we reestimate 
all our results (see Appendix Tables D1 and D2) with all states without the legal feature making up the control 
group. Our results are similar but slightly weaker. This is expected since our results show that stronger or broader 
laws reduce spillovers and adding states to the control group which have other stronger or broader laws leads to less 
of a difference between the treatment and control group. 
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Next, following Neumark, Song, and Button (2017) we include all three disability 
discrimination law features in the same regressions. We then follow the same approach for age 
discrimination laws, examining lower firm size, then larger damages, and then both at the same 
time. Finally, we follow Neumark et al. (2019) and do a combined analysis with all disability and 
age discrimination laws. Since the lower firm size for age and disability are very similar, we 
follow Neumark et al. (2019) and create one indicator variable for whether either the age or 
disability discrimination law has a firm size minimum of less than 10. 
RESULTS 
Average Effects of SSA1983 on Spillovers to SSDI 
We begin by presenting the estimates for the average spillover effect of SSA1983 on 
SSDI application and receipt. Table 4 presents the results for SSDI applications. In our preferred 
specification in Column (8), which includes all law variables, the estimated spillover is 0.0008 
(standard error 0.0003, significant at the 1 percent level), or an increase in the application rate of 
0.08 percentage points. The estimated spillover is similar in the other columns. This 0.08 
percentage point increase is relative to an average SSDI application rate of 1.33 percent per year 
(Table 3), so this is about a 6.0 percent increase in SSDI applications. This is in line with 
previous work that finds an increase in spillovers of between 0.9 percent to 7.0 percent for a 
similar population of those affected by SSA1983 (Li and Maestas 2008). 
Table 5 presents the results for SSDI receipt. Similar to how the rate of SSDI receipt is 
half that of the SSDI applications, the results are about half as large, so about half of SSDI 
applications are eventually successful. Our preferred estimate (Column [8]) shows that the 
receipt rate increases by 0.0005 (standard error 0.0002, significant at the 1 percent level), or a 
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0.05 percentage point increase. This is a 6.9 percent increase relative to the average receipt rate 
of 0.72 percent per year, mirroring the 6.0 percent increase in SSDI applications. Thus, we are 
able to replicate earlier work showing that the SSA1983 did, indeed, create spillovers onto SSDI. 
Cross-Sectional Differences in SSDI use by State Laws 
We next explore whether there is a cross-sectional relationship between state laws and 
SSDI application and receipt. Table 4 presents the relationship for SSDI application. We do not 
find any cross-sectional relationship between existing state disability discrimination laws and 
SSDI applications. For age discrimination laws, however, there is some evidence that both a 
lower firm size (Column [5]) and larger damages (Column [6]) are associated with fewer SSDI 
applications, but these results are not robust to the inclusion of other laws in the regression 
(Columns [7] and [8]). 
Table 5 presents the relationship for SSDI receipt. The results for age discrimination laws 
are similar, where there is some evidence that both a lower firm size (Column [5]) and larger 
damages (Column [6]) are associated with fewer SSDI receipt, but these results are not robust to 
the inclusion of other laws in the regression (Columns [7] and [8]). We do, however, find some 
results for disability laws, but in the opposite direction as expected. We find that SSDI receipt 
rates are higher in states with larger damages for disability, as shown in Columns (4) and (8). We 
therefore do not see a clear cross-sectional relationship between existing state age and disability 
discrimination laws and SSDI applications and receipt for older individuals.  
Moderating Effects of Existing State Laws on Spillovers to SSDI 
We now move to our main analysis of how the spillovers to SSDI from SSA1983 were 
moderated by existing state laws. In addition to determining if laws moderated spillovers, this 
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also provides a more credible way to estimate the causal effect of state laws on economic 
outcomes and program use that does not rely on cross-sectional comparisons.  
Table 6 presents the results for SSDI applications. The coefficient for SSA1983, in the 
first row, represents the spillovers in control states. For example, in Columns (1) to (4), the 
estimate for SSA1983 captures the spillovers for states with no broader or stronger disability 
discrimination law features (i.e., no medical definition, firm size 10 or greater, no larger 
damages). Similarly, the SSA1983 estimate in Columns (5) to (7) is based off the spillover in 
states without a lower firm size for age and without larger damages for age discrimination. In 
Column (8), where we analyze both age and disability discrimination laws, the estimate for 
SSA1983 is based off states without any broader or stronger features from either age or disability 
discrimination laws. Across all columns, the coefficient for SSA1983 is larger than it was in 
Table 4, suggesting that spillovers were generally larger in states without stronger or broader 
laws. For example, the estimated spillover in Column (8), our preferred specification since it 
includes all state laws, is 0.0016 (standard error of 0.0006, significant at the 1 percent level), 
suggesting a 0.16 percentage point increase. This is roughly double the corresponding estimate in 
Table 4 (0.08 percentage point increase). This pattern of larger spillovers in states with fewer 
discrimination protections is reflected in some of the interactions as well. 
In contrast with the cross-sectional results in Table 4 for disability discrimination laws, 
we find evidence that broader or stronger state disability discrimination laws reduce SSDI 
applications. For the medical definition of disability, our preferred specification (Column [8]) 
shows that there are effectively no spillovers in states with a medical definition of disability. The 
coefficient estimate for the interaction is −0.0015 (standard error 0.0007, significant at the 5 
percent level), which is similar to the estimate of the spillover in control states (0.0016). This 
29 
estimate is similar in Columns (1) and (4). For lower firm size, the estimates are negative, 
showing a reduction in spillovers, but are of a smaller magnitude (−0.0009 to −0.0005) compared 
to the medical definition, and are not statistically significant. There is some evidence the larger 
damages under disability discrimination law reduces spillovers. The estimates are between those 
for firm size and medical definition, ranging from −0.0014 and −0.0010, and are only sometimes 
statistically significant (significant Column [3], but not [4] or [8]). Thus, we find evidence that 
stronger and broader disability discrimination laws reduce applications to SSDI, with this 
evidence being strong and robust for the medical definition of disability, and being a moderate 
size, but not robust, for larger damages, and being largely nonexistent for lower firm size. 
For the effect of age discrimination laws on moderating SSA1983-induced applications to 
SSDI (Table 6, Columns [6] to [8]), we do not find any statistically significant evidence that age 
discrimination laws have any moderating effect. The estimates are negative, however, ranging 
from to −0.0008 to −0.0000.  
These estimated effects on SSDI applications differ from our cross-sectional results. For 
the cross-sectional analysis, we find that age discrimination laws were associated with lower 
SSDI applications, not disability discrimination laws. This mismatch may be because there are 
cross-sectional correlations between laws and other variables that affect SSDI applications (Coe 
et al. 2011; Strand 2002; Gruber and Kubik 1997). Our main results here do, however, match 
similar cross-sectional results in Neumark, Song, and Button (2017), who find that the medical 
definition of disability is associated with increased hiring of older workers relative to younger 
workers. 
We find effects in a similar direction for how disability discrimination laws moderate 
spillovers to SSDI receipt (Table 7). Across all disability discrimination laws, the coefficients are 
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smaller, ranging from −0.0012 to −0.0003, and statistically significant for lower firm size and 
larger damages. Thus, there is some evidence to claim that disability discrimination laws reduced 
the number of individuals receiving SSDI.  
Given that we also find few effects of age discrimination laws on SSDI application, we 
find few effects for SSDI receipt. These results are presented in Table 7. These estimates are 
similar to those for SSDI receipt (Table 6), but in this case there is some statistical significance. 
We find a statistically significant effect (at the 10 percent level) for lower firm size in one case 
(Column [7]), but the other two cases (Columns [5] and [8]) are not statistically significant.  
The fact that the results are weaker and less statistically significant for SSDI receipt could 
be for a few reasons. First, we may lack precision to detect effects, which are likely smaller than 
the effects on SSDI applications. Second, there could of course not be any effects, which could 
be the case if the induced applications would not have been successful. For example, we find that 
the medical definition of disability decreases applications to SSDI, but not receipt of SSDI. The 
medical definition makes the existing disability discrimination law broader, covering individuals 
with less severe conditions that are medically diagnosed but do not meet the onerous 
“substantially limit” requirement. If these individuals with less severe conditions are able to find 
work, and thus do not apply to SSDI, these applications that were less likely to have been 
approved were foregone. This could partially explain the fact that we find effects on SSDI 
application, but not receipt, for the medical definition of disability, but this requires further 
investigation. Third, it may be that SSDI receipt decreases, but only for certain subpopulations 
that we cannot identify with the aggregated SSDI data.  
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Exploring heterogeneous effects 
Our main estimates include both women and men and cover affected cohorts of the age 
groups 50–54, 55–59, and 60–64. We explore how our estimates may vary for these age groups 
and by gender, although our ability to explore heterogenous effects is much better with the HRS 
data, which we are in the process of using.  
We start by estimating effects separately for women and men. Most of the literature 
investigating the effects of discrimination laws focuses on men only while just a few studies 
explore more in-depth age and gender intersectionality (Song McLaughlin 2018; Lahey and 
Beasley 2018; Neumark and Button 2014; Neumark, Burn, and Button 2019), which turns out to 
sometimes be important, especially if women face more age discrimination (Neumark, Burn, and 
Button 2019; Lahey and Oxley 2018; Neumark et al. 2019) and age discrimination laws are less 
able to protect older women (Song McLaughlin 2018; Button 2019). 
Appendix Tables C1 and C2 present estimates for SSDI applications and SSDI receipt, 
respectively, for men only, and Appendix Tables C3 and C4 present the same but for women 
only.  
For men only, the estimates for how the medical definition of disability affects SSDI 
application (Appendix Table C1) are still large in magnitude but are now less precise compared 
to the pooled results in Table 6 and are now statistically insignificant. For men only, there are no 
statistically significant interaction effects with state laws for SSDI application. For SSDI receipt, 
there is some weak evidence of effects. Both lower firm size under age and disability 
discrimination laws have interaction effects that are significant at 10 percent level (Columns [2] 
and [7]) but these are not robust to the inclusion or exclusion of other laws. 
For women, Appendix Table C3 shows that the magnitude of the effects of the medical 
definition on spillovers to SSDI applications is similar for men, but the estimates for women are 
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far more precise, leading to the coefficients in all three regressions to be significant at the 1 
percent level. Similarly, larger damages for disability also decreases SSDI applications for 
women only, with both larger and more precise coefficients compared to men only or the pooled 
estimates. Two of these estimates are significant at the 1 percent level while one is significant at 
the 5 percent level. There is also weak evidence that the firm size for disability matters for 
women only, via the statistically significant estimate in Column (2) (5 percent level), but this is 
not robust to the inclusion of other laws (Columns [4] and [8]). Age discrimination laws again do 
not affect spillovers.  
For women only, there do appear to be some statistically significant effects on SSDI 
receipt. As Appendix Table C4 shows, larger damages for disability leads to reductions in SSDI 
receipt, with the magnitude of the spillover reduction being roughly the same size of the 
spillover, suggesting no spillover in these states. These estimates are statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level in all three cases. Mirroring the pooled results (Table 7), there is also 
evidence that a lower firm size, under both age (Column [7]) and disability (Column [2]) 
discrimination laws, reduces SSDI receipt for women. However, these estimates are again only 
significant at the 10 percent level and are not robust to inclusion or exclusion of other laws in the 
regression. Similar again to the pooled results, the medical definition of disability has no 
statistically significant effect on SSDI receipt, despite the large effect on applications.  
We next estimate results without age group 50–54, thus including only age groups 55–59 
and 60–64, who are relatively more affected by SSA1983. Appendix Tables C5 and C6 present 
the estimates for SSDI applications and SSDI receipt, respectively. These results are generally 
similar and stronger. For SSDI application, the estimates are larger and more statistically 
significant for the medical definition of disability and larger damages for disability. However, 
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the one estimate that was marginally statistically significant (10 percent level) for lower firm size 
for disability in the main results (Table 6, Column [2]) is now not significant. There are still no 
statistically significant effects of age discrimination laws outside of the same marginally 
significant estimate (Column [7]) for the effects of firm size for age on SSDI receipt. 
Robustness checks 
We conduct several robustness checks, considering other plausible specifications. We 
present all of these results fully in Appendix D. To summarize, we check whether our results 
vary based on the following: 
1) Using a similar control group to as in Neumark, Song, and Button (2017), where all states 
are included in the regressions for Columns (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6) rather than having 
the control group only include states without any broader or stronger law features 
(Appendix Tables D1 and D2). 
2)  Weighting the regression by the population of the state of age 50 and older (Appendix 
Tables D3 and D4). 
3) Dropping 2009 and 2010 from the analysis to remove possible effects from the Great 
Recession (Appendix Tables D5 and D6).29 
4) Removing the CPS ASEC control variables (Appendix Tables D7 and D8). 
5) Rerunning the “medical definition of disability” results adding Minnesota, which also has 
a broader (but not medical) definition of disability (Appendix Table D9). 
 
29 While the Great Recession officially occurred from December 2007 to June 2009, according to the 
NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee (see http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html, accessed September 29, 
2018), the effects on the labor market were lagged (see Neumark and Button 2014), and we chose to drop 2009 and 
2010 for this reason, and also because decisions around SSDI application may also come after these delayed labor 
market effects. 
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Tables 8 and 9 summarize the main results for SSDI application and receipt, respectively, 
and how robust they are based on these checks (excluding number 5 above) and the 
heterogeneity analysis in Appendix C. For SSDI application, the results for the medical 
definition of disability are somewhat robust, with 17 out of 22 possible estimates being 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and 13 out of 22 at the 5 percent level. Two 
factors have a meaningful impact on the results. First, the statistical significance goes away for 
men only due to an increase in the standard errors (Appendix Table C1). Statistical significance 
also decreases from 5 percent, 10 percent, and 5 percent (Columns (1), (4), and (8), respectively) 
in Table 6 to 5 percent, insignificant, and insignificant when the CPS ASEC control variables are 
removed (Appendix Table D7). These control variables are important in explaining SSDI 
application and thus removing them reduces precision. All other robustness or heterogeneity 
checks have a smaller effect on the results. Since the main results (Table 6) are either significant 
at the 5 percent level (2 out of 3 times) or at the 10 percent level (1 out of 3), all the other 
robustness checks often cause the estimates to change a bit such that they move to 5 percent from 
10 percent, or vice versa. 
For larger damages, the results are much less robust, for example, only 5 out of 22 
estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. There appear to be results for larger 
damages only when looking at subpopulations that are most affected: women (Appendix Table 
C3 and ages 55–64 (Appendix Table C5) rather than 50–64. For firm size (either age or 
disability) and larger damages (age), there is almost no evidence of effects. 
For SSDI receipt, the results are much more marginally significant and are less robust 
compared to for SSDI applications. For larger damagers for disability, where there is the largest 
evidence of effects, 6 out of 22 estimates are significant at the 5 percent level, and 12 are 
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significant at at least the 10 percent level. Thus, the evidence here that larger damages for 
disability decreases spillovers onto SSDI receipt is not particularly strong, outside of the strong 
and statistically significant effects for women only. There is similarly some weak evidence of 
lower firm size for disability decreasing spillovers, but this is even less robust: only 2 out of 22 
estimates are significant at the 5 percent level, and only 7 are significant at at least the 10 percent 
level. For firm size for age, there are similarly only seven estimates that are significant at at least 
the 10 percent level, but no significance beyond that. Across all specifications and tables, no 
estimates are statistically significant for the medical definition of disability or larger damages for 
age.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we study broader disability and age discrimination laws at the state level to 
see how they affect SSDI application and receipt for older workers. Older workers are likely to 
be affected by disability discrimination laws since they are more likely to have a disability and 
are also more likely to be perceived to have a disability, and this discrimination based on 
perception is protected again in disability discrimination law. Both disability and age 
discrimination laws at the state level that have broader coverage (cover individuals at smaller 
businesses or cover individuals with less severe disabilities) or are stronger (can sue for more 
damages) could reduce barriers to employment by reducing discrimination and increasing on-
the-job accommodations, making it less likely that some older workers must rely on SSDI. On 
the other hand, it is also possible that these laws make it most costly to hire older workers and 
individuals with disabilities in the first place, creating a negative incentive to hire them and 
leading to increased spillovers to SSDI. 
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To investigate this, we leveraged the Social Security Amendments Act of 1983 
(SSA1983), an exogenous policy change that increased the full retirement age gradually from 65 
to 67 and increased the penalty to claiming Social Security benefits early. As others have 
documented (e.g., Neumark and Song 2013), this reform pushed affected cohorts of older 
workers into the labor market in attempts to work longer, as was intended by the reforms. 
However, this led to spillovers to SSDI applications and SSDI receipt, as we and others 
document (Li and Maestas 2008; Duggan, Singleton, and Song 2007). If stronger and broader 
discrimination laws do in fact affect employment opportunities for older workers, then we should 
see that they moderate the effect of these spillovers.  
To quantify how existing state laws moderate spillovers, we use a difference-in-
differences identifications strategy—comparing cohorts who are affected by SSA1983 to those 
of a similar age who are not affected—and then comparing this difference by state laws. We find 
that stronger and broader disability discrimination laws, but not age discrimination laws, reduce 
SSDI applications. In particular, we see this effect most strongly for the medical definition of 
disability, where some states cover individuals with a medically diagnosed condition under 
disability discrimination laws, avoiding the strict federal ADA standard that the condition must 
“substantially limit” a “major life activity.” We find evidence that in many cases there is no 
spillover to SSDI applications in states with the medical definition of disability. We find weaker 
evidence that being able to sue for larger damages under state disability discrimination law 
compared to federal law also reduces spillovers. Both these results are stronger for women than 
for men and are stronger for those aged 55–64 rather than 50–64, reflecting that those at ages 
closer to retirement are relatively more affected by SSA1983.  
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We find fewer effects on SSDI receipt. We find some evidence of reduced spillovers to 
SSDI receipt, especially for women, in states with larger damages under disability discrimination 
law. There is also some evidence, albeit weaker, that lower firm sizes for disability or age 
discrimination laws may also reduce spillovers to SSDI receipt. Thus, existing state-level 
discrimination laws could help reduce reliance on SSDI and take pressure of the Social Security 
Trust Fund as the population ages. 
The results for lower firm size and larger damages are similar for SSDI applications and 
receipt. For disability, there is evidence that a lower firm size or larger damages reduce both 
applications and receipt, and for age, there is evidence is pretty consistent that lower firm size 
and larger damages affect neither applications nor receipt. In contrast, the medical definition of 
disability significantly reduces spillovers to SSDI applications but never has any effect on SSDI 
receipt.  
The fact that the effects on application and receipt align for lower firm size and larger 
damages but not for the medical definition of disability could be explained by the types of 
individuals that are affected by these stronger or broader laws. For larger damages, the same 
number of individuals are covered by laws, but the law just has more “bite” since plaintiffs can 
possibly get larger damages. For firm size and the medical definition of disability, the law 
expands to cover more individuals. For firm size, individuals at smaller firms are covered, while 
for the medical definition of disability, those with less severe conditions who do not meet the 
“substantially limits” requirement of the ADA are covered. Our hypothesis to explain these 
results is that those who are induced not to apply to SSDI in states with the medical definition 
would not have gotten approved for SSDI anyways. This may be a feasible explanation, since the 
medical definition of disability increases disability discrimination protections to those with less 
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severe conditions, and these less severe conditions are less likely to qualify for SSDI. But this 
requires additional investigation using the HRS data that we are currently analyzing. This data 
allows us to estimate effects by they of disability of health condition, which will allow us to test 
if this hypothesis is correct. 
While our results only sometimes show that existing state laws reduce SSDI receipt, their 
ability to more significantly reduce SSDI applications is incredibly important, even if these 
application reductions do not translate into reductions in SSDI receipt, as is the case for the 
medical definition of disability. SSDI applications are particularly expensive for both applicants 
and the Social Security Administration to process, especially if cases get appealed. The SSDI 
application process imposes both direct and indirect costs on applicants. The direct costs include 
time and resources spent gathering all the necessary documentations required for the application. 
There are also monetary costs if lawyers are involved, which is common.  
The indirect costs, however, may be even larger. These come from the potential 
employment and earnings losses of applicants due to the determination process for SSDI 
eligibility, and these costs are faced regardless of the ultimate acceptance or denial of the claim. 
To satisfy the “inability to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA)” clause of eligibility for 
SSDI, most SSDI applicants drop out of the labor force well before filing an application and stay 
out of the labor force during the process of determination, which can vary from six months to 
several years (Autor et al. 2015). This prolonged determination process together with human 
capital deterioration due to long nonemployment status results in large employment and earnings 
losses, especially for denied SSDI applicants in the short run as well as in the long run (Autor et 
al. 2015; Khan 2018; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011). The proportion of workers who 
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are bearing these costs without receiving SSDI benefits in the end are rising over time.30 Thus, 
preventing these SSDI applications through providing more appropriate employment 
opportunities instead could have a large impact both on marginal SSDI applicants and on the 
strained Social Security Trust Fund. 
These high costs of SSDI applications are also, unfortunately, more likely to be realized 
for the marginal applicants who are induced to apply to SSDI based more on the economic shock 
of SSA1983 and less on the severity of their medical conditions and are thus more likely to be 
denied. The fact that we find that the medical definition of disability decreases SSDI applications 
but not SSDI receipt may suggest that this broader disability discrimination law reduces SSDI 
applications that were less likely to be successful in the first place. 
In addition to learning how stronger and broader state laws affect SSDI application and 
receipt, we also learn how they affect employment discrimination in general. The literature, both 
theory and empirical studies, are unclear on whether discrimination laws improve or worsen 
economic outcomes for protected groups, especially disability discrimination laws where the 
laws are stronger because they require reasonable accommodations. The literature on how 
disability discrimination laws affect older workers is also very thin. We improve on the methods 
in the literature by using an exogenous source of variation, the SSA1983, to estimate the causal 
effects of these laws. This avoids critiques in the earlier literature, such as the difficulty in 
coming up with a control group with similar trends, or the statistical costs around only exploiting 
changes in a federal law rather than leveraging state variation (see Button 2018). 
 
30 The total number workers applied for SSDI has gone up from 1.3 million in 1992 to 2.6 million in 2013, 
the sample period analyzed in this paper. The proportion of people received benefits decreased from 53 percent in 
1992 to 40 percent in 2008 (Social Security Administration 2017). 
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There is much future work that can be done to continue to answer these questions. 
Notably, we are currently using restricted state identification data of HRS respondents and File-
831 disability records to merge with the HRS publicly available data, which will allow us to 
follow individuals over time and measure effects on labor market outcomes, such as hiring, 
separations, employment, and retirement, along with, again, SSDI applications and receipt. The 
individualized data will also allow us to better explore heterogeneity so that we can determine 
who faces the most spillovers and who is most affected by state laws. This is especially 
important because the population of individuals with disabilities is highly heterogeneous and 
effects may differ by disability type (Armour, Button, and Hollands 2018; Button, Armour, and 
Hollands 2017a,b). Moreover, the individual data will allow us to pin down the age and year of 
SSDI application of the benefit recipients, which will help us estimate more precisely the effects 
of these stronger and broader employment protections in moderating the spillovers of SSA1983 
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Table 1  The Effect of the Social Security Amendments of 1983 (SSA1983) on OASI Benefits for Primary 
Earners, by Age at Retirement and Year of Birth 
Year of birth 
Full benefits retirement age 
(FRA) 
Benefit as percentage of primary insurance amount 
(PIA) received if retiring at… (%) 
Age 67 FRA Age 65 Age 62 
1934–1937* and earlier 65 106-113 100 100.0 80.0 
1938* 65 + 2 months 111.9 100 98.9 79.2 
1939* 65 + 4 months 111.7 100 97.8 78.3 
1940* 65 + 6 months 110.5 100 96.7 77.5 
1941* 65 + 8 months 110.0 100 95.6 76.7 
1942* 65 + 10 months 108.8 100 94.4 75.8 
1943* 66 108.0 100 93.3 75.0 
1944–1951** 66 108.0 100 93.3 75.0 
1952–1954 66 108.0 100 93.3 75.0 
1955 66 + 2 months 106.7 100 92.2 74.2 
1956 66 + 4 months 105.3 100 91.1 73.3 
1957 66 + 6 months 104.0 100 90.0 72.5 
1958 66 + 8 months 102.7 100 88.9 71.7 
1959 66 + 10 months 101.3 100 87.8 70.8 
1960 and later 67 100.0 100 86.7 70.0 
NOTE: * indicates cohorts that will be included in our future HRS sample; ** indicates cohorts that are also included in our 
aggregated SSDI data sample, but not our future HRS sample.  





Table 2  State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws, 1992–2000 
State 
Disability discrimination laws Age discrimination laws 
Minimum 
firm size 






Larger damages  
than ADEA 
Alabama  No law No law No law 20 No 
Alaska 1 Yes No 1 No/Yes  
(changed 1997) 
Arizona 15 No No 15 No 
Arkansas 9 No (same as ADA) No No law No law 
California 5 Yes (uncapped) No (“limits” as 
of 2001) 
5 Yes 
Colorado 1 No (same as ADA) No 1 No 
Connecticut 3 No (unclear) Yes 3 No 
Delaware 4 No (same as ADA) No 4 Yes 
District of Columbia 1 Yes (uncapped) No 1 Yes 
Florida 15 No (punitive capped at 
$100k) 
No 15 Yes 
Georgia 15 No No 1 No 
Hawaii 1 Yes (uncapped) No 1 Yes 
Idaho 5 No (punitive capped at $10k) No 5 Yes 
Illinois 1 No  Yes 15 Yes 
Indiana 15  No  No 1 No 
Iowa 4 No  No 4 Yes 
Kansas 4 No (no punitive damages, 
damages capped at $2k) 
No 4 Yes 
Kentucky  15 No  No 8 Yes 
Louisiana 15 No  No 8/20  
(changed 1997) 
Yes 
Maine 1 Yes No 1 Yes 
Maryland 15 No (same as ADA) No 15 Yes 
Massachusetts  6 Yes (uncapped) No 6 Yes 
Michigan 1 No  No 1 Yes 




Mississippi No law No law No law No law No law 
Missouri 6 Yes (uncapped) No 6 Yes 
Montana 1 No  No 1 Yes 
Nebraska 15 No  No 25 No 
Nevada 15 No  No 15 No 
New Hampshire 6 No  No 6 Yes 
New Jersey 1 Yes (uncapped) Yes 1 Yes 
New Mexico  4 No  No 4 Yes 
New York 4 No  Yes 4 Yes 
North Carolina 15 No  No 15 No 
North Dakota 1 No  
(no damages) 
No 1 No 
Ohio 4 Yes (uncapped) No 4 Yes 
Oklahoma 15 No  No 15 No 
Oregon 6 Yes (uncapped) No 1 Yes 
Pennsylvania 4 No  No 4 No 
Rhode Island 4 Yes (uncapped) No 4 Yes 
South Carolina 15 No (same as ADA) No 15 No 
South Dakota 1 No  No No law No law 
Tennessee 8 No  No 8 Yes 
Table 2  (Continued) 
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State 
Disability discrimination laws Age discrimination laws 
Minimum 
firm size 






Larger damages  
than ADEA 
Texas 15 No (same as ADA) No 15 No/Yes  
(changed 1993) 
Utah 15 No  No 15 No 
Vermont 1 Yes (uncapped) No 1 No/Yes  
(changed 1999) 
Virginia 1 No  No 1 No 
Washington 8 No  No 8 Yes 
West Virginia 12 Yes (uncapped) No 12 No 
Wisconsin 1 No  No 1 No 
Wyoming 2 No  No 2 No 
NOTE: State laws cover 1992 to 2000. For the states listed as “Yes” under “Larger damages than ADA,” but not uncapped, 
details are as follows: Alaska—uncapped compensatory damages, punitive damages capped above ADA levels; Maine—exceeds 
ADA cap for firms of 201+ employees. For states listed as “No” under “Larger damages than ADA,” unless otherwise noted, the 
“No” is because punitive damages are not allowed. See Neumark et al. (2019), and especially the online appendix to that paper, 
for more information on the laws. 
SOURCE: Age discrimination laws are from Neumark and Song (2013) and disability discrimination laws are from 





Table 3  Summary Statistics—Aggregated SSDI Application and Receipt and CPS ASEC Control Variables 
 



















SSDI application rate 0.0133 0.0118 0.0126 0.0134 0.0144 0.0127 0.0129 0.0153 
SSDI receipt rate 0.0072 0.0069 0.0071 0.0076 0.0072 0.0071 0.0071 0.0078 
Working-age populations (mil) 4.19 8.25 4.16 4.39 4.50 4.11 4.93 2.45 
Proportion of men in 16+ population 0.484 0.476 0.485 0.484 0.479 0.485 0.484 0.482 
Proportion of 50+ in 16+ population 0.360 0.365 0.360 0.362 0.356 0.359 0.359 0.365 
Proportion of African American/black in 
16+ population 0.105 0.132 0.079 0.010 0.164 0.086 0.101 0.123 
Proportion of Hispanic in 16+ population 0.074 0.113 0.070 0.072 0.081 0.068 0.083 0.064 
Proportion completed high school in 16+ 
population  0.809 0.817 0.822 0.812 0.788 0.819 0.813 0.789 
Proportion with work-limiting disability 
in 16+ population 0.103 0.085 0.099 0.103 0.108 0.010 0.101 0.116 
Proportion of 16+ in agriculture, mining, 
and construction 0.075 0.049 0.075 0.067 0.074 0.073 0.071 0.080 
Labor force participation rate 0.668 0.659 0.678 0.663 0.654 0.676 0.669 0.651 
Unemployment rate 0.061 0.064 0.061 0.068 0.058 0.061 0.063 0.058 
Yearly per capita real disposable 
personal income  34,053 41,726 35,391 35,892 31,610 35,293 35,127 30,180 
N 3,774 296 2,442 1,110 1110 2,516 2,220 888 
NOTE: Column (5) includes states that have disability discrimination laws that are similar to the ADA in all dimensions (i.e., no medical definition, no larger damages, no firm 
size < 10). Similarly, Column (8) includes states that have age discrimination laws that are similar to the ADEA in all dimensions. Age groups 50–54, 55–59, and 60–64 are 
included in all the samples. 




Table 4  Effects of the SSA1983 and the Cross-Sectional Impacts of State Disability and Age Discrimination 
Laws on SSDI Application Rates 





















… … 0.0006 
(0.0006) 
… … … 0.0005 
(0.0006) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … 0.0006 
(0.0004) 











Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0003 
(0.0005) 
N 1,406 3,534 2,216 3,756 3,386 3,094 3,756 3,756 
NOTE: The mean SSDI application rate is 0.0133. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level. Significantly 
different from zero at 1-percent level (***), 5 percent level (**) or 10 percent level (*). Columns (1)–(3) compare states with 
each law feature to control states that have no disability discrimination law features beyond the ADA (i.e., the other law variables 
equal 0). Similarly, Columns (5)–(6) compare state with each law feature to control states that have no age discrimination law 
features beyond the ADEA. Columns (4), (7), and (8) include all 50 states plus D.C. Age groups 50–54, 55–59, and 60–64 are 
included in all the regressions. The models include age-group fixed effects and year fixed effects. All the models also include 
variables that vary across states and over time, such as, labor force participation rates, unemployment rates, proportion of African 
American/black, proportion of Hispanic, proportion of working-age population completed high school degree, proportion of 
working-age population reported work-limiting disability, proportion of population 50 or over, faction of population works in 
agriculture, mining, and construction industry, and per capita real disposable personal income. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using aggregated Social Security Disability Insurance statistics and the age and disability 




Table 5  Effects of the SSA1983 and the Cross-Sectional Impacts of State Disability and Age Discrimination 
Laws on SSDI Receipt Rates 





















… … 0.0001 
(0.0004) 
… … … 0.00001 
(0.0005) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … 0.0006** 
(0.0003) 











Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0002 
(0.0004) 
N 1,406 3,534 2,216 3,756 3,386 3,094 3,756 3,756 






Table 6  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Application Rates 

















SSA1983 x …         




… … −0.0015* 
(0.0008) 
… … … −0.0015** 
(0.0007) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0010 
(0.0007) 











Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0005 
(0.0006) 
N 1,406 3,534 2,216 3,756 3,386 3,094 3,756 3,756 




Table 7  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Receipt Rates 

















SSA1983 x …         




… … −0.0003 
(0.0009) 
… … … −0.0003 
(0.0008) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0009* 
(0.0005) 











Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0007 
(0.0004) 
N 1,406 3,534 2,216 3,756 3,386 3,094 3,756 3,756 
NOTE: See the notes to Tables 4 and 6. 
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Table 8  Summary of Heterogeneity and Robustness Checks for the Interactions between State Disability and 
Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers to SSDI Application Rates 
 
Number of estimates that are significantly 
different from zero at… Insignificant at 
any level 
Total number 
of estimates 10% level 5% level 1% level 
Medical definition of disability 17 13 3 5 
22 
Firm size < 10 (disability) 5 3 0 17 
Larger damages (disability)  9 5 1 13 
Firm size < 10 (age) 2 1 0 20 
Larger damages (age) 2 1 0 20 
NOTE: This table summarizes the main results (Table 6) and the heterogeneity and robustness checks (except Appendix Table 





Table 9  Summary of Heterogeneity and Robustness Checks for the Interactions between State Disability and 
Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers to SSDI Receipt Rates 
 
Number of estimates that are significantly 
different from zero at… Insignificant at 
any level 
Total number 
of estimates 10% level 5% level 1% level 
Medical definition of disability 0 0 0 22 
22 
Firm size < 10 (disability) 7 2 0 14 
Larger damages (disability)  12 6 0 10 
Firm size < 10 (age) 7 0 0 15 
Larger damages (age) 0 0 0 22 
NOTE: This table summarizes the main results (Table 7) and the heterogeneity and robustness checks (except Appendix Table D9). 
Estimates significant at the 1% (5%) level are also counted in the 5% and 10% (10%) columns. 
 
 
Appendix A: Summary of Disability and Age Discrimination Literature 
 
Table A1  Summary of Empirical Studies on the Effect of Disability Discrimination Laws on Individuals with 
Disabilities 
Study Legal variation studied Treatment group Outcomes studied and results 
DeLeire (2000) ADA (1992) Work-Limited Disability 
(WLD) 
Employment (−),  
Wages (−) 
DeLeire (2001) ADA (1992) WLD Wages (−) 
Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001)  
ADA (1992) WLD Employment (−),  
Earnings (−) 
Beegle and Stock 
(2003) 
Pre-ADA state laws WLD Employment (null),  
Earnings (−),  
Labor force participation (−) 
Kruse and Schur 
(2003) 
ADA (1992) WLD, Limitations to ADLs 
(ADL) 
Employment (+ or − depending 
on measure of disability) 
Houtenville and 
Burkhauser (2004) 
ADA (1992) WLD; 2-period WLD Employment (− or null, 
depending on measure of 
disability) 
Hotchkiss (2004) ADA (1992) WLD Employment (null) 
Jolls and Prescott 
(2004) 
Adoption of the ADA, given 
existing state laws 
WLD Employment (− only in states 
without preexisting reasonable 
accommodation law, otherwise 
null) 
Carpenter (2006) Cook v. Rhode Island (federal) Obese v. not (via BMI) Employment (+) 
Bell and Heitmueller 
(2009) 
UK’s Disability Discrimination 
Act 
WLD, ADL Employment (− in short-term) 
Thompkins (2015) ADA, some post-ADA 
SCOTUS cases, and the 
adoption of the ADAAA 
(2009) 
WLD Employment (−, ADA; null, 
SCOTUS; null, ADAAA) 
Ameri et al. (2018) ADA (post ADAAA), state 
laws (see Neumark, Song, 
and Button, 2107) 
Resume-Correspondence 
study with spinal cord 
injury or Asperger’s. 
Callbacks (+ if covered by ADA, 
null for state laws) 
Button (2018) CA’s Prudence Kay Poppink 
Act (2001) 
WLD Employment (+), 




Table A1  (Continued) 
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Study Legal variation studied Treatment group Outcomes studied and results 
Button, Armour, and 
Hollands (2017a) 
ADA, some post-ADA 
SCOTUS cases, and the 
adoption of the ADAAA of 
2009 
WLD by Type (Salient 
Physical, Non-Salient 
Physical, Mental Retard. 
& Dev. Dis., Other 
Mental), ADL 
Early results suggest… 
 
Hiring, ADA (+ for non-severe 
ADL limitations, otherwise 
null), 
Hiring, ADAAA (+ for non-
salient physical, − for severe 
ADL limitation, otherwise 
null), 
Separations – Involuntary, ADA 
(+ for salient physical, − for 
non-salient physical, otherwise 
null), 
Separations – Involuntary, 
ADAAA (- for salient 
physical, otherwise null) 
Button, Armour, and 
Hollands (2017b) 
Replication of Jolls and 
Prescott (2004), Post-
ADA/Pre-ADAAA changes 
in state laws, adoption of 
ADAAA given existing 
state laws, cross-sectional 
differences in state law 
features 
See above Early results suggest few effects 
of all this state law variation.  
Armour, Button, and 
Hollands (2018) 




Table A2  Summary of Empirical Studies on the Effect of Age Discrimination Laws on Older Workers 
Study Legal variation studied Treatment group Outcomes studied and results 
Neumark and Stock 
(1999) 
Pre-ADEA state age laws, 
ADEA 
Older vs. Younger (Men 
only) 
Earnings Growth (+),  
Employment (+)  
Adams (2004) Pre-ADEA state age laws, 
ADEA 
White men Employment (+) 
Retirement (−) 
Hiring (null) 
Lahey (2008) Less burdensome to file age 
discrimination claims in 
some states at the 
introduction of the 
ADEA 
White men older than 50 Hiring (−), 
Weeks Worked (−), 
Retirement (+) 
Labor Force Participation (−), but see 
Neumark (2009) for a discussion 
of how the effects could be 
interpreted differently, showing 
positive effects. 
Neumark and Song 
(2013) 
Cross-sectional state age 
discrimination laws 
interacted with SSA1983 
Men “Caught” by 
SSA1983 vs. not 
Hiring (+ “larger damages” (age), + 
“lower firm size (age)”) 
Neumark and Button 
(2014) 
Cross-sectional state age 
discrimination laws 
interacted with Great 
Recession 
Older (55+) vs. younger 
(25-44) 
Unemployment Rate (+, men, larger 
damages),  
Unemployment Duration (−/+ men, 
lower before and higher during and 
after GR, −, women, during GR), 
Employment (−, women, firm 
size),  
Hiring (−/+, women, higher before 
and lower during and after GR) 
Neumark et al. 
(2019) 
Cross-sectional state 
differences in age and 
disability laws. 
Resume-correspondence 
study with older (age 
64–66) vs. younger 
(age 29–31) 
Callbacks (+ for men and women for 
states that allow larger potential 
damages than the ADEA, null for 
firm size)  
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Table A3  Summary of Empirical Studies on the Effect of Disability Discrimination Laws on Older Workers 
Study Legal variation studied Treatment group Outcomes studied and results 
Stock and Beegle 
(2004) 
Pre-ADA state laws Older vs. younger Employment (+ only if combined 
with age discrimination laws) 
Neumark, Song, and 
Button (2017) 
Cross-sectional state 
differences in age and 
disability laws. 
Older vs. younger (both 
w/o WLD) 
Hiring (+ broader definition, null 
otherwise) 
Neumark et al. 
(2019) 
Cross-sectional state 
differences in age and 
disability laws. 
Resume-correspondence 
study with older (age 
64–66) vs. younger (age 
29–31) 
Callbacks (+ for women in states 
with larger potential damages 







Appendix B: Details on the Calculation of OASI and SSDI Benefits 
 
 
Understanding the benefit structures of OASI and SSDI programs is important to 
understanding how the SSA1983 made SSDI relatively more generous than OASI for people 
born after 1937. The first step in determining the cash benefit for either program is calculating 
the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). For OASI benefits, the AIME is the average of 
the top 35 years of earnings, indexed to the year of age 60 using the Average Wage Index (AWI), 
divided by 12 to make it per month. For SSDI benefits, the AIME is the average of earnings from 
the year a worker turned 21 to the year of disability onset, indexed using the AWI to the year of 
disability onset. If a worker with a disability has over 35 years of indexed earrings, the Social 
Security administration averages the 35 highest years of earnings for SSDI benefit calculation. 
The next step in calculating benefits under both programs is determining the Primary 
Insurance Amount (PIA), based on a progressive benefit equation.31 The formula for calculating 
the PIA is the same for both OASI and SSDI. The OASI benefits are exactly equal to their full 
PIA only if they first claim the benefits at their FRA. If retirees choose to receive benefits earlier 
than their FRA, their benefits are adjusted downward by more for each month that the claim was 
earlier than the FRA.32 The earliest age for OASI claiming is 62 and it has the largest actuarial 
reduction factor. On the other hand, the SSDI beneficiaries receive their full PIA regardless of 
the age at which they start receiving benefits.
 
31 The progressivity ensures that lower income workers receive a higher return on their Social Security 
taxes than the higher income workers. This is achieved by breaking the AIME into three parts and weighting each 
part differently. The breakpoints in AIME to calculate PIA are adjusted annually based on changes in national 
average wages. However, the weighting scheme remains the same. For example, for a worker with a 62nd birthday 
in 2016, the PIA is equal to 90 percent of the worker’s first $856 of AIME, plus 32 percent of the AIME between 
$856 and $5,157, plus 15 percent of the remaining AIME. 
32 OASI benefits are reduced by five-ninths of 1 percent times the number of months between claiming and 
the FRA, if claiming was no more than 36 months early; if benefits were claimed more than 36 months early, 
benefits are reduced by five-twelfths of one percent per month up to where the 36-month period begins. 
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Appendix C: Tables for Heterogeneous Effects by Gender and Age Group 
 
Table C1  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Application Rates—Effects on Men Only 

















SSA1983 x …         




… … −0.0015 
(0.0012) 
… … … −0.0016 
(0.0012) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0005 
(0.0010) 











Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0006 
(0.0007) 
N 703 1,767 1,108 1,878 1,693 1,547 1,878 1,878 






Table C2  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Receipt Rates—Effects on Men Only 

















SSA1983 x …         




… … −0.0002 
(0.0012) 
… … … −0.0003 
(0.0012) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0008 
(0.0007) 













Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0009 
(0.0006) 
N 703 1,767 1,108 1,878 1,693 1,547 1,878 1,878 





Table C3  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Application Rates—Effects on Women Only 






















… … −0.0014*** 
(0.0004) 
… … … −0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0015** 
(0.0006) 













Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0004 
(0.0006) 
N 703 1,767 1,108 1,878 1,693 1,547 1,878 1,878 





Table C4  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Receipt Rates—Effects on Women Only 






















… … −0.0003 
(0.0006) 
… … … −0.0003 
(0.0005) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0011** 
(0.0004) 













Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0005 
(0.0004) 
N 703 1,767 1,108 1,878 1,693 1,547 1,878 1,878 





Table C5  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Application Rates—Effects on Ages 55–64 Only 






















… … −0.0017** 
(0.0008) 
… … … −0.0017** 
(0.0008) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0014* 
(0.0008) 













Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0003 
(0.0006) 
N 1,026 2,582 1,618 2,744 2,474 2,260 2,744 2,744 





Table C6  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Receipt Rates—Effects on Ages 55–64 Only 

















SSA1983 x …         




… … −0.0003 
(0.0010) 
… … … −0.0003 
(0.0010) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0011* 
(0.0006) 













Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0007 
(0.0006) 
N 1,026 2,582 1,618 2,744 2,474 2,260 2,744 2,744 





Appendix D: Tables for Robustness Checks 
 
Table D1  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Application Rates—Alternative Control Group Using All States 











SSA1983 x …      
Medical definition of disability −0.0016** 
(0.0008) 
… … … … 
Firm size < 10 (disability) … −0.0009* 
(0.0005) 
… … … 
Larger damages (disability)  … … −0.0010 
(0.0007) 
… … 
Firm size < 10 (age) … … … −0.0008 
(0.0006) 
… 
Larger damages (age) … … … … −0.0005 
(0.0006) 
N 3,756 
NOTE: See the notes to Tables 4 and 6. Columns 4, 7, and 8 of Table 4 are not repeated here as they would be the same as in 
Table 6. Compared to Table 6, the control group here is all states without that particular law feature, regardless of if they have 
other stronger or broader laws. This follows how the control group is defined in Neumark, Song, and Button (2017).
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Table D2  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Receipt Rates—Alternative Control Group Using All States 











SSA1983 x …      




… … … … 
Firm size < 10 (disability) … −0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
… … … 
Larger damages (disability)  … … −0.0009* 
(0.0005) 
… … 
Firm size < 10 (age) … … … −0.0008* 
(0.0004) 
… 
Larger damages (age) … … … … −0.0002 
(0.0005) 
N 3,756 





Table D3  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Application Rates—Weighting by Each State’s 50 Years or Older Population  






















… … −0.0016** 
(0.0008) 
… … … −0.0014* 
(0.0008) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0007 
(0.0005) 
Firm size < 10 
(age) 













Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.00003 
(0.0005) 
N 1,406 3,534 2,216 3,756 3,386 3,094 3,756 3,756 
NOTE: See the notes to Tables 4 and 6. Weights for each state’s population of those 50 and older come from our estimates from 





Table D4  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Receipt Rates—Weighting by Each State’s 50 Years or Older Population 






















… … −0.0007 
(0.0007) 
… … … −0.0006 
(0.0007) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0004 
(0.0005) 













Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0000 
(0.0004) 
N 1,406 3,534 2,216 3,756 3,386 3,094 3,756 3,756 





Table D5  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Application Rates—Dropping 2009–2010 from the Sample 

















SSA1983 x …         




… … −0.0014* 
(0.0007) 
… … … −0.0015** 
(0.0007) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0010 
(0.0007) 













Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0005 
(0.0006) 
N 1,330 3,342 2,096 3,552 3,202 2,926 3,552 3,552 






Table D6  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Receipt Rates—Dropping 2009–2010 from the Sample 

















SSA1983 x …         




… … −0.0003 
(0.0008) 
… … … −0.0003 
(0.0008) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0009* 
(0.0005) 













Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0007 
(0.0004) 
N 1,330 3,342 2,096 3,552 3,202 2,926 3,552 3,552 





Table D7  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Application Rates—Estimates without Control Variables 

















SSA1983 x …         




… … −0.0011 
(0.0009) 
… … … −0.0012 
(0.0009) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0010 
(0.0007) 













Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0008 
(0.0006) 
N 1,406 3,534 2,216 3,756 3,386 3,094 3,756 3,756 





Table D8  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Receipt Rates—Estimates without Control Variables 

















SSA1983 x …         




… … −0.0002 
(0.0009) 
… … … −0.0003 
(0.0008) 






… … … … 
Larger damages 
(disability)  




… … … −0.0009* 
(0.0005) 













Firm size < 10 
(disability and/or 
age) 
… … … … … … … −0.0007 
(0.0005) 
N 1,406 3,534 2,216 3,756 3,386 3,094 3,756 3,756 





Table D9  Interactions between State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws and SSA1983-Driven Spillovers 
to SSDI Application and Receipt Rates—Adding Minnesota to Medical Definition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













SSA1983 x …       
Broader definition of 













Firm size < 10 (disability) … −0.0005 
(0.0006) 
… … −0.0006 
(0.0004) 
… 








Larger damages (age) … … −0.0000 
(0.0005) 
… … 0.0003 
(0.0005) 
Firm size < 10 (disability 
and/or age) 
… … −0.0005 
(0.0006) 
… … −0.0007 
(0.0004) 
N 1,480 3,756 3,756 1,480 3,756 3,756 
NOTE: See the notes to Tables 4 and 6. We add Minnesota to the medical definition states since it also has a broader definition of 
disability via only requiring that a condition “limits” rather than “substantially limits.” Here we re-do Columns (1), (4), and (8) in 
Tables 6 and 7. 
 
